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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the South-North Exchange (SNX) is to "foster and
sustain a trans-national, cross-disciplinary and inter-cultural dialogue on
current issues in law, theory and culture that are of common interest across
the Americas." In its third meeting the SNX raised the fundamental
question to its participants as to "whether and how existing models of
formal democracy,.usually from the North, may serve to guide or misguide
'transitions' to democracy taking place chiefly across the southern portions
of the hemisphere." This Essay examines the need to move beyond formal
democracy by first outlining the general theory as defined by the late
Anglo-American political philosopher John Rawls. It then addresses an
alternative approach built from concepts posited by the Russian
interdisciplinary thinker Mikhail Bakhtin, to better account for the cultures
of citizenship that are emerging under pluralistic conditions in the
Americas.
If it is true that a common story for the Americas begins with conquest,
genocide, slavery, and an ever-widening gap between rich and poor, South
and North, then why look to formal democracy? Would not any nod of
approval toward a system of justice simply defending a dominant ideology
that has reproduced the conditions of oppression for centuries? The
Americas (referencing Latin American countries) lack a common public
* This Essay is based on a paper given to the Third South-North Exchange sponsored by
the Center for Human Rights, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Inter-Americana de Puerto Rico,
December 2003. Greg M. Nielsen, Professor of Sociology, Concordia University, Montreal.
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culture that fosters the exchange of views from the North and South and
effective institutions to promote continental equality between regions.
Consequently, it seems prudent to debate the concepts that define the
meaning of justice in a democratic form.
John Rawls, best known for his works, The Theory of Justice,Political
Liberalism, the Law of Peoples, and Justice as Fairness:a Restatement,
is one of the most sophisticated and influential thinkers to have linked
formal democracy to the liberal tradition of justice. To remain clear and
consistent with Rawls, I refer to "formal democracy as "liberal
democracy" for the remainder of the Essay. Rawls offers a general theory
about what a liberal democratic society should be like in both domestic
and global terms and does not critique actual regimes. I suggest that his
theory ofjustice also maintains a weak version of liberal socialism because
he argues against any enlargement of the gap between the wealthiest and
the poorest when no improvement occurs for the poorest individuals. Thus,
it is important not to confuse Rawls's theory of liberal democracy with
growing variants of neo-liberal ideologies that advocate anti-state
intervention and deregulation in favor of monopolies and consumers on a
global scale.
For many individuals, however, Rawls is an unlikely choice as an
interlocutor for a SNX. His claim to have developed an ideal model for
liberal democracy that could be universally applied is dismissed by some
as a thinly disguised justification of the American justice system and
foreign policy.' I focus on Rawls because regardless of whether one agrees
with his position, he raises awareness about several issues about domestic
and global justice. This is especially true if one assumes that the historical
poetic of the Americas is constituted in a multiplicity of voices and a
transgrediant or crossover mixture of origins that take on elements from
one another and maintain their independent origins. At first blush any
general theory of democracy that might pretend to account for collective
self-understandings in all cases seems implausible. On the other hand,
there cannot be as many models for democracy as there are identities for
peoples. The paradox between universalism and particularism is part of the
long history of debate over democracy. 2 A middle ground would take into
account that the many self-understandings in the Americas require
theorizing radical diversity. This approach needs to consider some general

1. See RAYMOND GEUS, OUTSIDE ETHICS 11-28 (2006).
2. Liberal democracy differs for example from Ancient, Mid-Evil, and other forms in the
sense that the two terms only become paired some 500 years ago (a significant date one might say).
See generally CHANTAL MOUFFE. THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2000).
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theory about what self determination, citizenship, and democracy should
encompass.
Ideal or normative theory has a different purpose than theories built
from political activism or empirical research, therefore it should not be
judged by the same criteria.3 A criticism of Rawls that may develop should
respect this constant and not simply reach into "the real world" of
inequality and injustice to dismiss Rawls's entire industry. I argue that one
should move beyond Rawls's theory of liberal democracy and towards a
more dialogized theory of pluralism. To accomplish this it is imperative
to challenge Rawls's more transcendental claims and bring the theory of
justice back into the context of cultural diversity. I probe the outer limits
of Rawls's position and make conceptual suggestions as to how it might
apply to the theory and practice of the SNX. I initially treat his concepts
hermeneutically rather than critically. My goal is to develop a multisided problem that is necessary for the SNX to get a handle on Rawls's
main concepts so as to avoid dismissing the paradigm in advance. I
perceive normative theory to consist of how to adjust, borrow, insert, edit,
as well as how to oppose, absorb, or negate ideas placed in the puzzles of
social and political thought - all in order to reasonably and convincingly
answer questions like how democracy should work under ideal conditions.
In the first section below, I outline my understanding of Rawls's basic
contractual definitions of domestic and global justice found in The Law of
Peoples,including some cursory definitions of the main concepts that form
his political philosophy and sociology from previous works. The concepts
include: justice as fairness, the basic structure, the original position, the
veil of ignorance, overlapping consensus, reflexive equilibrium, and
reciprocity. In the second section, I outline an argument suggesting that

3. At the beginning of a very lively attempt to provide a critical response to Rawls's theory
of equality, Kai Nielsen argues
we should do ideal theory in order to gain, free from all strategic questions
concerning instrumentalities and the like, a sense of what our practices,
institutions, laws and so on would have to be like to be perfectly just ... Still, we
need to face hard live political and economic questions... But to help give us a
sense of direction... we also need to confront the questions of ideal theory.
140 (2003).
4. Counterfactual arguments are sought out to provide "reflexive equilibrium," and not to
refocus on the specific empirical case in order to negate the overall intention of the approach. In
other words, considering alternative theories should be at least a process of finding a point of
convergence on the most reasonable argument and not simply preparing a response to the most
powerful.
KAI NIELSEN, GLOBALZATION AND JUSTICE
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Rawls's theory of democracy derives a notion of "reasonable pluralism"
that is overly monologized, despite its claim of diversity.
Rawls's argument about reasonable pluralism is derived through what
he calls a "wide equilibrium." This equilibrium identifies insurmountable
ideological differences between "comprehensive doctrines" but also allows
for the possibility of reaching an "overlapping consensus" on certain
conceptions of ideal justice, which in turn provide societal unity. I agree
that the process of seeking an "overlapping consensus" on the concept of
justice is important but do not agree that the existence of a liberal
democracy depends on such a transcendent consensus. This view is a form
of monologic theorizing in the sense that it does not postulate the
anticipation of a response in the lived context. As in any transcendent
universalism, this approach assumes that the final word is independent of
any original practice or context.
On the other hand, a dialogic approach to theorizing pluralism takes the
anticipation of rejoinder between agents as the object of study. Dialogical
pluralism focuses on the immediate emotional and volitional tones within
diversity. Here, there can be no last words as long as the dialogue and the
agents are alive.
In the third section, I sketch out a series of suggestions to strengthen
the weak version of the difference principle to better reach the level of a
South-North sense of justice and redistribution. More specifically, I
disagree with the limitation of the main principle of citizenship rights to
civil, political, and social rights. This limitation leaves no satisfactory
explanation for dealing with vexing questions about cultural rights which,
in their initial forms, appeal to the emotional-volitional impulse and not
legal imperatives. I draw on Rawls's distinction between rationality and
reasonableness to theorize about an emotional-volitional dimension in
democracy and show how emotion and volition cannot be explained
through his argument with a "wide equilibrium." Rawls does take emotion
or will into consideration, but he casts it so uniquely within moral reason
that he leaves the active aesthetic shaping of public culture unaccounted.
I introduce each of the above three sections against the aesthetic
principle of two-sided answerability as proposed by Bakhtin.5 As indicated
above, Rawls contends that deliberative democratic dialogues need to be

5. See generally, Mikhail Bakhtin, TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OFTHE ACT (Michael Holquist
& Vadim Liapunov eds., Vadim Lippunov trans., University of Texas Press, 1st ed. 1993) (1993);
MlKHAiL BAKHTIN ART AND ANswERABmx1y: EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (Michael Holquist
& Vadim Liapunov eds., Vadim Liapunov trans., University of Texas Press 1st ed. 1990) (1990);
MIHAIL BAKHTiN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS (Caryl Emerson ed., Caryl Emerson
trans., University of Minnesota Press 1984) (1984).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol17/iss3/4

4

Nielsen: For and Against John Rawls: Reflections on South-North Citizenshi

CONSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS: JUSTICE, IDENT

AND REFORM

reasonably reciprocal. I build on his distinction between reasonableness
and rationality to argue that accountability is two-sided. Citizens situated
in the same basic societal structures and who engage in public debate over
democratic issues are accountable to a variety of emotional-volitional
orientations regarding common understandings as well as to nonconvergent differences. This concept demands more than reciprocity in the
sense Rawls understands it. Rawls sees a measure of reasonableness as the
precondition for free and equal citizens who must accept each other's
arguments if they are rational. Otherwise, these citizens could not expect
their own arguments be accepted. My objection to Rawls on this issue is
that double-sided answerability is not just reasonable in the moral
psychological sense but is also aesthetically shaped and accessed through
transcultural differences.
H1. READING FOR RAWLS
Rawls's liberal democracy includes rights to property, voting, the
formation of political parties, popular sovereignty, and symmetrically
applied legal procedures in the formal sense, and is also concerned with
the question of "distributive justice" and "democratic equality." Rawls's
grounds each of these features and concerns in his theory of justice as
fairness. The theory consists of two very general principles of justice that
are posed in a way that is difficult to refute. The first ideal principle of
justice is the guarantee of a list of basic liberties. The second principle
(also called the difference principle) is that any "social and economic
inequalities are there to satisfy two conditions: first, they are attached to
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and second, they are to be the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society." 6 Whereas the list of basic liberties
includes mainly civil and political rights, the difference principle includes
mainly social rights. Rawls argues for a form of distributive justice that
would spread justice evenly in order to reproduce the basic institutions of
society across generations and to reproduce agents who actively participate
in "society as a fair system of cooperation over time.",7 In this sense, both
principles of justice as fairness are practiced within a variety of public
institutions and on a variety of levels that make-up the basic structure of
society.

6. JoiN-RAWLS, JusTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42-43 (Erin Kelly ed., Belknap

Press 2001) (2002).
7. Id. at 50.
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How might Rawls see the goal of self-determination and democracy in
the SNX? Would Rawls's approach mean enforcement of some penalty
against self-determination that is not achieved according to the rule of law
- for example, the case of the military coup? Who might enforce such a
transgression and under what authority? Would democratic aspirations for
sovereignty need direct investment in the global South to help balance the
difference principle with the North? While Rawls does not expand on any
empirical cases that might help the SNX, he does wave a red flag in front
of the idea that the exchange is reducible to a bare economic redistribution
of resources without political recognition. In fact, the question remains
open as to how to reconcile democratic deficits and economic disparities
between regions in Rawls's model.
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls applies his theory of justice as fairness
at the domestic level of nation-states to the level of global justice. Part one
of his argument covers the ideal theory of a social contract for a society of
liberal democratic peoples as one kind of society. Part two discusses nonliberal people as another kind of society that have features that for them to
be included in the society of peoples. Part three takes up non-ideal theories
where regimes do not follow the law of peoples and also discusses how
societies within the law of peoples should react to societies who act
outside the law of peoples. Following Kant, Rawls argues against the idea
of world government and for the principles of self-determination within
constitutional regimes that are supported by the rule of law. Rawls
distinguishes between justice in the domestic sense where the actors are
citizens that make up a sovereign state and where the actors are peoples
who make up a global "society of peoples" and who respect "the principals
and norms of international law and practice."'
For Rawls, "reasonable liberal peoples" inhabit well-ordered and
decent societies. Rawls distinguishes between two kinds of decent peoples:
hierarchical peoples or peoples who develop various forms of
representative democracy, and other decent peoples, an open residual
category of peoples who consult various forms of hierarchy. Non-liberal
"benevolent absolutist" societies may be decent in the sense that they take
care of their members and respect universal human rights but are not likely
to be well ordered, "because their members are denied a meaningful role
in making political decisions." 9 Societies that do not respect either human
rights or domestic law and that do not take care of their citizens are neither
well ordered nor decent. "Societies overburdened with unfavorable

8. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 3 (1999).
9. Id. at 4.
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conditions" may fall into this latter category as well as "outlaw states" that
commit international crimes and stand outside "the law of peoples."
"Liberal peoples have three basic features: a reasonably just
constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental
interests; citizens united by what Mill called 'common sympathies,' and
finally, a moral nature."' Liberal societies have as part of their basic
structure, a set of institutions that reproduce the cultural conditions in
which a common commitment to a moral sense of justice can prevail. A
well ordered society is one that guarantees the right of its citizens to
participate in the public realm through a consultation hierarchy
(representative or deliberative democracy) and that guarantees basic rights
that define justice as fairness.
Like other contract theorists in political philosophy, Rawls argues that
a state extends natural law. A "state" is not like a "people" because a state
has sovereignty and a "people" do not. The term "peoples" he says "is
meant to emphasize singular features ... and to highlight their moral
character and the reasonably just, or decent nature of their regimes.""
Rawls sees a large degree of difference between peoples and political
cultures. Justice as fairness does not negate a "reasonable pluralism" but
rather provides a more narrow political theory of justice. This means
Rawls needs a concept that can explain how "free and equal" citizens in
both the domestic and global cases can introduce a norm or arrive at a fair
agreement that everyone can recognize in the "here and now" despite
enormous differences and possibly irresolvable disagreements between
comprehensive doctrines within the polity. Rawls proposes linking
the concept of the "original position" and its supporting assumption of the
"veil of ignorance," as a way of extending the theory of justice as fairness
into the basic structure of liberal democracy. This then becomes a
mechanism for encouraging overlapping consensus about what justice
should be like.
Rawls's theory linking the "original position" and "veil of ignorance"
concepts is derived from a simple thought experiment that seeks to
determine what could reasonably be agreed as a means to derive the ideal
form of how justice should work. First, imagine representatives in liberal
democracy who speak without knowing about the "particular
comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent." [The
representatives] do not know the persons' race, ethnic group, sex, or other

10. Id. at 23.
11. See id. at 25.
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characteristics such as strength and intelligence."' 2 The point is to remove
any subjective factors that may influence the way the ideal is developed.
At the first level of the basic structure, citizens in a liberal society
would speak without knowing everything about their interlocutors. Ideally,
the citizens speak through a "veil of ignorance," and they can, at any point,
enter into discussions about the choice of the "first principles of a
conception of justice which is to regulate all subsequent criticism and
reform of institutions."' 3 This is the first stage in the adoption and
application of the two principles of justice. The "veil of ignorance" is
gradually lifted from representations of citizens as the final two stages
unfold: first, the constitutional assembly consisting of representatives
working out civil and political rights, and secondly, then the legislature
and the judiciary, taking into consideration the difference principle. 14 At
the level of global justice, it is the peoples, not the citizens, who are
represented through the original position and the "veil of ignorance.""
Rawls's theories of "justice as fairness" and the "law of peoples" leave
two dilemmas for the SNX on democracy and self-determination. First,
how do we enter a continental exchange between liberal and relatively
non-liberal democracies, and between the wealthiest societies and the most
economically burdened ones? Second, both communitarians and
libertarians might agree with the desirability of the "well ordered society"
(defined as a society that offers accessibility to public office and
conditions of equal opportunity for all citizens) and with the difference
principle, but how does exchange occur between societies whose degree,
order, and economic polarity are so hugely disparate? In other words, what
do we need to do to get to a place where the "veil of ignorance" might be
assumed? Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness" sets out a series of
constants that can help guide the way the SNX should follow, but it is
missing a concrete set of concepts that might better focus the approach. I
next develop a series of tentative arguments that help retain both the notion
of the well-ordered society and the difference principle, but at a

12. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 15.
13. See JOHN RAWLS, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE 12-13 (1971).

14. JOHN RAWLS, POLriCALLIBERALISM 373-434 (1993).
15. Rawls insists that the theory of justice as fairness at both the domestic and global level
is not part of a comprehensive doctrine such as one finds in moral philosophy or in religion. Rawls
states that a political theory oriented to providing a realistic utopia. "Political philosophy is
realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinarily thought of as the limits of practical
political possibility." RAWLS, supra note 8, at 6. He states further that "[O]ur hope for the future
of our society rests on the belief that the social world allows a reasonably just constitutional
democra[cy] existing as members of the Society of Peoples." RAWLS, supra note 8, at 11.
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transcultural and aesthetic level, rather than a transcendent or overarching
one.
II. READING AGAINST
Reading against Rawls means taking into consideration the possibility
his transcendent argument for a realistic utopia is circular. This is the first
point. A major criticism of Rawls is that he dissolves conflict and
dismisses cultural rights because of the ongoing "fact" of reasonable
pluralism in modem democracies. 6 In order to avoid Rawls's
overemphasis on reason as opposed to emotion, and overemphasis on
moral psychology rather than aesthetic shaping, I re-introduce my
adaptation of Bakhtin's principle of two-sided answerability. Bakhtin's
theory explains the idea of multiple sympathies toward the just and the
right in a way that keeps both conflict and mutual understanding in play.
This concept means that politics should he understood not only through
ideal universal postulates, but also through individual and creative ways
of shaping the just and the right within direct practices and inside specific
contexts.
The principle of two-sided answerability accounts for both consensus
and conflict. This theory argues that no matter how closed off a
comprehensive doctrine, it remains answerable to all those it might
exclude or subject to violence. Answerability suggests a two-sided process
in which a citizen anticipates a general or objective understanding of an
idea as well as a unique performance of an act. In other words, the "doer
behind the deed" is answerable for a unique event and toward a general
ideal. The two-sided principle of answerability responds to two potentially
conflicting questions, "what should I do in the North when faced with
someone in the South who can answer back?" and "How can the I reach
understanding with the other and vice versa?"' 7 The answers to the
question about the just and the right lead to two theoretical directions
different than those Rawls might consider.
At an extreme, the first question requires transcultural understandings
for the political that accommodate the creative dimension or eventness,
which occurs when dominant, and subalternate lifeworlds crossover. One
must suspend the ideal theory of an "overlapping consensus between

16. CHANTAL MOUFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2000).
17. See generally GREG M. NIELSEN, THE NORMs OF ANSWERABIUTY:
BETWEEN BAKTIN AND HABERMAS

SOCIAL THEORY

(2002).
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comprehensive doctrines," to get at an emotional level of exchange. To do
this, presumably, each party must have access to the others tradition as
much as possible without harming one another. This proposition is the
most controversial because it assumes that an exchange between unequals
is not only possible but also potentially creative.
The second question leads back to an ideal theoretical definition of
metanorms, or, to ideal agreements about a well-ordered society and the
difference principle that are practically necessary. Political acts are more
than rational when actors anticipate a rejoinder to their utterance, gesture,
or choice in practice. Hence, in non-ideal theory, transculturalism must
consider more than rationality, power differentials, and antagonisms.
Transculturalism is also creative. At the level of metanorms, even the most
comprehensive of doctrines remain answerable to all other doctrines. Thus,
the principle of two-sided answerability assumes an anticipation of justice
with the appropriate response and also a potentially creative deed, or
transcultural innovation. The latter postulate is missing in Rawls's ideal
theory. On the other hand, his theory posits a stable basic structure in
which the "well ordered society" can be imagined.
A dialogic approach to pluralism based on the two-sided principle of
answerability does not mean seeking agreement from an exchange of
opposite positions unified by a higher level of generality (like legal
procedure). Dialogized pluralism is also built through emotional-volitional
orientations, a phronesis, where all kinds of agents seek a response from
one another and can consummate a shared and adversarial exchange.
Rawls' s concept of reasonable pluralism and the corollary theory ofjustice
as fairness suspends the second side of answerability and looks to explain
local dialogues about the "good" in terms of their institutional
transformation into the more universal claims about "the just" and "the
right." In the process of such an ideal theory, a "lived" form of democracy
is simply not theorized, but then Rawls acknowledged that this is not the
job of ideal theory. "Justice as fairness is a political, not a general
conception of justice; it applies first to the basic structure and sees these
other questions of local justice and also questions of global justice.., as
calling for separate consideration on their merits.""8
Theories of dialogical pluralism may be criticized for not providing
general normative prescriptions for democratic ideals, however, ideal
theories like Rawls's suffer from an opposite deficiency. Rawls's
descriptions of pluralism are limited by a search for a unifying agreement
about the just and the right which does not in fact reflect the deep cultural

18. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 11.
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diversity in South-North polities. Therefore, the dialogic approach to the
SNX would not assume different parties are "ideally" interested in
achieving understanding, as Rawls might propose. Nor would the dialogic
approach oppose direct models of democracy and radical alternative
struggles around claims to self-determination.
For any mass society, direct democracy is at best a short-term strategy
that helps transform the basic structure. In the short term, strategic or
critical claims for self-determination may or may not lead to dialogue in
which communication partners actively seek out mutual understanding.
For example, a people may choose not to enter into deliberation as a
strategic way to achieve its goals. This does not mean, however, that the
agent purposefully avoids conflict because of an already achieved
''overlapping consensus."
Any long-term strategy needs a basic structure and system of
representation to provide stability. There are limits to any asymmetric
form of justice, both substantive and formal. South-North orientations that
seek a response from each other can consummate a shared, but possibly
adversarial exchange. A hierarchy implies internal conflicts between the
many, the one within, and between both regions.
The dialogical model of pluralism should not be constrained by an
assumed norm of order, such as Rawls's "justice as fairness." Constraints
would expel struggles, and disorderliness (civil disobedience, revolution,
or civil war) that may be critical to a process of communicative
engagement, depending on the gap within the difference principle. Conflict
is not only about material conditions of discourse and the space contested,
but also between contradictory temporal ideals and active aesthetic
shaping emotional responses. On the other hand, the political is not only
about preparing for points of antagonism. Here, Rawls has a stronger point
that the political is about finding ways to redistribute justice and about
ways to expand deliberation through broad reflexive equilibrium. This
results in expanding the possibility for citizens to share more complex,
differentiated and overlapping lifeworlds in ways that assure they can be
represented, heard, and recognized in public culture.
LV. FOR THE SOUTH-NORTH EXCHANGE
My final point concerns the extension of Rawls's two principles of
justice to a third concept allowing cultural rights for citizenship. These
rights would support the basic liberties and the difference principle. The
basic liberties and the difference theory are the two main points in Rawls's
definition of justice as fairness at the domestic level. These are the theories
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that support civil and political rights and social rights, respectively. Both
sets of rights are historically entrenched in the modem definitions of
citizenship as they first developed in the West during the eighteenth,
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. 19 The contemporary emergence of the
debate over cultural rights coincides with and is intensified by the
progressive weakening of unifying forces that centered the sovereign
nation-state. Rawls sees the question of cultural difference as part of
pluralism and a wide variety of comprehensive doctrines in the liberal
polity. The reflexive equilibrium that centers the just and the right is
organized within the basic structure aided by the leveling effect of legal
procedures that help keep societal institutions well ordered. Rawls assumes
that the basic structure and symmetrically applied legal procedures remain
the main neutralizing forces in producing a common sympathy for
unifying principles of justice and rights in both the domestic case and in
the society of peoples.
Dialogical pluralism provides a way to think about multi-voiced
cultural self-understandings together (the cultural meanings and stories
behind the basic liberties). It also imagines the autonomy for each voice
(especially but not exclusively in terms of the difference principle). To
paraphrase Rawls, not only would the gap between wealth and poverty be
legitimate if it benefits the poorest, but also if it benefits the less
advantaged cultural formations. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls also
considers the shift in the two principles of domestic justice to international
law since World War i and 1989. Universal human rights respond, in part,
to cultural rights but lack the balancing principle that recognizes cultural
rights as a principle of justice as fairness. Thus, Global justice will always
remain unevenly and unfairly applied. Since the concept of human rights
is already contained in the first principle of domestic justice, Rawls thinks
that the main impact on global justice is on the new limits placed on the
internal sovereignty of domestic states.
Rawls points out that applying the difference principle to the
discrepancy between wealth and poverty in the society of peoples fails at
the global level. The application fails for the same reason that the first
theory of justice is also restricted to the domestic level. For example,
notions of justice are restricted to the domestic regimes and are not
regulated at the global level of justice because not all regimes are liberal
democracies. International order is less than perfect and the question
remains as to the degree to which liberal regimes should accept non-just
societies or conversely encourage them to move toward liberal democracy.
19. T.H. Marshall, CitizenshipandSocial Class,in SOCIOLOGY ATTHECROSSROADS 67-128
(L.M. Mead ed., 1963).
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As Samuel Freeman stated: "The implication is that an international order
of independent peoples can be just without all its members being just (in
the liberal democratic sense) towards their own people."2
What is the implication for Rawls's theory regarding the application of
asymmetric cultural rights that indigenous people and national minorities
have struggled to obtain for many years?2" Do such claims represent a
radical case in the sense they risk transforming all those who are seeking
greater self-determination to potentially overturn the terms of justice and
right at the domestic level? Indigenous "peoples" and national minorities
are leading the struggle for recognition of cultural rights, however, as
"peoples" they remain answerable to all other "peoples" when they take
actions through interregional and global forums to gain rights they have
been refused at the domestic levels. This means they are operating well
within the limits of the "law of peoples."
Another more controversial example is the alter-globalization
movement slogan, "No One is Illegal?" This concept may be an unrealistic
utopia, after all what kind of society could this be? Has there ever been
such a society? Could there be? Should there be? On one hand, if special
citizenship rights of mobility were granted to the regions containing the
least advantaged and most vulnerable peoples in order to balance SouthNorth inequality, what might be the effect on the "well ordered society"?
On the other hand, what is the fate of "decent peoples" in the Americas if
these rights are not granted soon?"
This Essay cannot adequately answer these questions. Whenever
intercultural acts of citizenship draw on cultural resources and lifeworld
background convictions for a response to questions of how to act when
faced with someone who can answer, (and for how to respectfully answer
someone irrespective of the degree of stranger-ness between them); the act
of citizenship is probably going to be a "good" one. Dialogical pluralism,
however, is not relativism. In other words, there is also the question of the
"right" act. There are things that need to be witnessed and doctrines that
cannot be dialogued because they do not value what Fred Evans calls a
struggle over "the audibility of voices." Dialogical pluralism "legitimates
withholding a policy-making role, though not audibility, from racist,
sexist, and other politically exclusionary doctrines. These doctrines deny
their hybridity in the multi-voiced social body... and we cannot therefore

20. Samuel Freeman, Introduction: John Rawls An Overview, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO RAWLS 48 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1st ed. Cambridge University Press 2003).
21. See generallyRON NEIZEN,A WORLD BEYOND DIFFERENCE (2003); Dominique Legros,
Indigenous Peoples' Self-Determinationand the Broken Tin Kettle Music of Human Rights and
Liberal Democracy, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 579-98 (2004).
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justifiably cede power to or affirm them, even though hearing them is
inescapable, at least as voices that we reject. 22 As long as each side takes
the others' discourse seriously and gives the other side access to an
ultimate word about themselves, then dialogical pluralism can do its work.
Retaining the final word on one's self is important because so much of
citizenship politics is about orientating in the worlds of others' words,
whereas political citizenship means taking the word as your own.

V. CONCLUSION

Although liberal democracy may have emerged in the Americas along
with many lamentable and suspicious social facts, I argue that with critical
revision it is necessarily a part of a progressive SNX. I focused on some
of the main questions and issues that need to be raised and revised in
support of ideal democratic principles that pay special attention to social
as well as cultural difference. My goal throughout this Essay was to
expand discussion beyond the formal institutions, such as the courts and
the state apparatus at the domestic and regional levels and focus on a more
fundamental reflection of social justice.
In conclusion, I have reviewed John Rawls's key concepts in order to
sketch out the ideal liberal democracy at the domestic and transnational
level. Using Bakhtin's principles, I argued that the definition of'justice that
Rawls proposes cannot be completely separated from the cultural
dimension because the relation must be understood through a dialogic
pluralism. Dialogic pluralism means that when different but equally valued
cultures, regardless of status, intersect they must come into inner semantic
contact, whether they confirm or negate one another. Dialogic pluralism
is different from an overlapping consensus because the meaning is not
simply a result of rational deliberation. In dialogical pluralism, meaning
is more than rational, it is answerable. This is answerable because when
cultures enter dialogue (like interlocutors in conversation), they anticipate
rejoinders from other cultures. Answerability between cultures is twosided because each enters dialogue from a unique position but seeks to
consummate concrete recognition. Returning Rawls's normative theory to
a more concrete dialogical pluralism allows a theory of cultural citizenship
for the Americas as a third principle in his justice as fairness argument.
This Essay sought to provide a discussion regarding the strengths and
weaknesses of Rawls's political theory and determine how his theory may

22. See generally Fred Evans, Multi-Voiced Society: PhilosophicalNuances on Rushdie 's
Midnight Children, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 727 (2004).
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be further developed to facilitate a comprehensive meaning of democracy
for a South North exchange on the evolving meaning of citizenship.
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